| Keywords: | Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), Relation public-private sector, Patent law. |
| Correct citation: | Manicad, G. (1999), "CGIAR and the Private Sector: Public good versus proprietary technology in agricultural research.". Biotechnology and Development Monitor, No. 37, p. 8-13. |
Mutual and complex interests
In 1995 the CGIAR established the Private Sector Committee (PSC),
composed of private sector representatives. The PSC is not intended to
raise funds for the CGIAR; rather, it was designed as a means of improving
the dialogue between the CGIAR and the private sector.
Like any other collaboration between different parties, searching for
mutual interest between the CGIAR and the private sector requires an understanding
of the corresponding costs, benefits and compromises. For example, to improve
its collected germplasm and elite breeding materials further, the CGIAR
needs to access new technology, expertise and capital in the private sector.
However, why should it be in the interest of the private sector to cooperate
with the CGIAR? According to Hubert Zandstra, Director General of
the CGIAR’s International Potato Centre (CIP), the CGIAR is attractive
for the private sector because of its global presence, with 16 centres
worldwide plus numerous NARS partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
For many governments, the CGIAR generally enjoys more credibility and goodwill
than the private sector. This complements the private sectors’ interest
in expanding its area of activities. Moreover, according to Zandstra, the
CGIAR has a broader understanding of agricultural knowledge systems, encompassing
the complexity of biological, ecological and social systems in developing
countries. In addition, the CGIAR germplasm collection comprises about
600,000 accessions that are stored under ex situ conditions in its centres.
This collection is kept in trust under a Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) regulated agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). The CGIAR’s collection constitutes only about 15 per cent of the
estimated 3.8 million samples stored ex situ worldwide, largely
by the public sector. However, the CGIAR’s collection is considered to
represent about 40 per cent of the unique food crop germplasm. Hence, cooperation
with the CGIAR could potentially not only help the private sector to expand
in area and clients, but also enhance its access to germplasm. Moreover,
according to the PSC, the CGIAR provides an attractive international network
for field testing mutually relevant transgenic crops in varied tropical
conditions, on the condition of strict compliance with legal regulatory
frameworks such as biosafety.
Sam Dryden, chair of the US Emergent Genetics Inc. (EGI),
and also chair of the PSC, confirms that one of the private sector’s interests
in cooperating with the CGIAR is that this could potentially lead to the
development of a new market: those small-scale farmers who are in transition
to fuller participation in the market economy. For the private sector,
substantial value could be created for these farmers who, while being relatively
poor, are great in number. For instance, it is estimated that worldwide
only 20 per cent of farmers purchase commercial seed. It would therefore
be attractive to tap the market potential of the remaining 80 per cent
of the farmers who use farm-saved seeds.
Dryden further states that while many private companies are more comfortable
in ‘known markets’ such as North America and Western Europe, the CGIAR
could assist the private sector in further expanding their businesses in
economies that are undergoing liberalization such as India and Vietnam.
If the private sector could create more value-added products for these
emerging markets, this could translate into further profit maximization,
since the technologies that the private sector has developed for the ‘known
markets’ could be applied to the newly emerging markets. For example, the
technology for US maize, rice or cotton could respectively be applied to
maize in Mexico, rice in India, or cotton in China.
The profit objective of the private sector is key in understanding
and in designing collaboration with its actors. In fact, their humanitarian
endeavours have always been linked with a good business sense. As Jaques
Barman, President of the Swiss Novartis Foundation said "...where
people grow, profits grow: this well-tried business rule is applicable
to development policy as well". The private sector’s interest in the
CGIAR is quite consistent with the private sector’s business policy. Especially
in the context of globalization, business has to grow, and to do this it
is not enough only to expand sheer capital investments. There should also
be economic development to absorb capital and create more market potentials.
As Klaus Leisinger, Director of the Novartis Foundation,
sharply puts it: "The rich have an enlightened self-interest to help
the poor…". He states that poverty, destruction of the environment,
and political instability are not independent phenomena at national and
international levels, and that political and economic instability in developing
countries threatens the industrialized nations.
The private sector’s ‘enlightened self-interest’ based on the interrelation
of economies is neither new, nor exclusive to the private sector. In fact,
the basic principle holds true for most, if not all, Official Development
Assistance (ODA). For example, the technologies of the Green Revolution
improved the maize, wheat, potato and rice of both developing and industrialized
countries. It is reported that while Italy donates about US$ 18 million
per year to IARCs and an additional US$ 4 million to the CGIAR centres,
the country has gained an estimated US$ 300 million per year from the improved
durum germplasm accessed from the IARCs and NARS. However, there is one
main difference: ODA’s organizational survival does not depend on profit,
as the private sector does.
Nevertheless, the often bloated and inefficient organizations of the
public sector could learn from the private sector’s management principle
of organizational efficiency. However, if organizational efficiency is
translated to curb research for marginalized client groups such as female
farmers, subsistence farmers and those involved in orphan commodity crops,
the CGIAR’s mission will be endangered.
Public good versus proprietary technology
At the presentation of the third systems review in October 1998, the
CGIAR seemed to be publicly very confident in pursuing further collaboration
with the private sector. However, for these partnerships the question of
ownership of the technologies developed is of critical importance. So far,
negotiations with regard to intellectual property rights (IPR) issues
have been on a case by case basis, depending on the individual centres.
The CGIAR has a provisional guideline with the principle of safeguarding
publicly funded research from monopolistic controls. However, much remains
to be done and the CGIAR needs to take a stronger public stance.
The third systems review recommends defensive patenting: "The public
nature of the patents held by the CGIAR could be maintained by allowing
the use of these patented varieties under a free license".
IPR protection to keep CGIAR’s research products within the public
domain contradicts the interest of the private sector. In the meantime,
the PSC criticized the CGIAR for its lack of a clear viewpoint and operational
stance on IPR. According to the PSC "… it is imperative that the system
outlines an operational framework which will eliminate the areas of policy
ambiguity which currently plague the system and prevent more effective
collaboration with the private sector… a more active approach, rather than
passive is required… For example, in biotechnology research… it should
develop system-wide positions on key policy areas that ultimately control
the delivery of biotech research to those likely to benefit".
Examples of collaboration
It is difficult to get a concise and up-to-date picture of the actual
research collaboration between the CGIAR and the private sector. To begin
with, the CGIAR itself needs to gain an up-to-date overview. More importantly,
the individual centres lack willingness to publicly disclose such activities.
This reluctance is caused by factors such as the CGIAR’s deficit of clear
IPR policies, the highly competitive nature of advanced research, which
tends to keep its ongoing projects confidential, and the possible adverse
public reactions to biotechnology. Given these constraints, below are some
indications.
Rather than mere research for the development of specific end products,
the collaboration largely pursues ‘enabling technologies’ such as germplasm
exploration and exchange, germplasm evaluation, landrace improvement, seed
regeneration, molecular marker technology, gene construction for transformation,
field trials and evaluation of research and development of transgenic products
and methods. Moreover, information is not only exchanged on technical matters,
but also on IPR implications for developing countries. Additionally, aside
from crops that are both for temperate and tropical areas, such as maize,
rice, potatoes and sorghum, many target crops are from the tropics, such
as banana, cacao, cassava, pearl millet and pigeon peas. Cooperation also
involves tropical trees and livestock. The extent of collaboration between
the CGIAR and the private sector has so far been very modest, both in the
number of activities and the funding involved. However, the table on page
12 notably indicates that the collaboration concentrates on strategic research
that could further enable the CGIAR and their NARS partners to acquire
and utilize biotechnology for further strategic purposes. An assessment
of the mechanics and lessons from these collaborations would have been
greatly relevant for policy making, not only to the CGIAR and their partners,
but also to the wider agricultural research community. Unfortunately, such
assessment is not available.
| Current and potential collaboration between the CGIAR, developing country NARS and the private sector in genetic resources research | |||||||
| Centre | Collaboration with the private sector |
NARS involvement |
Nature of collaboration | Private sector(s) involved | Potentials for further collaboration
with private sector |
||
| Yes | No | Yes | No | ||||
| CIAT | * | * | acquisition of gene and gene construct for transformation; licensing technologies for transfer to NARS | Novartis | technology acquisition from private sector; collaboration with private companies for research/development in transgenic products and methods | ||
| CIFOR | * | * | information exchange | no data | tree improvement; in situ biodiversity conservation | ||
| CIMMYT | * | * | evaluation of maize accessions of the genebanks of the Latin American Maize Programme | Pioneer | germplasm evaluation; gene introgression temperate-tropical maize and vice versa | ||
| CIP | * | * | development of transgenic potatoes with increased resistance to pest and diseases | • PGS
• Axis Genetics • Smart Plant International • Monsanto (in future) |
development of transgenic potatoes and sweet potatoes with increased resistance to pest and diseases; post harvest and marketing qualities; discovery of valuable genes in germplasm | ||
| ICARDA | * | * | joint technology development in DNA markers for genome analysis and transgenic crops | ||||
| ICLARM | * | genebanking | |||||
| ICRAF | * | * | genetic exploration and conservation of tropical trees which produce medicinal products | genetic selection and improvement of medicinal trees for cultivation in agro-forestry systems | |||
| ICRISAT | * | * | provision of parent seed lines for hybrid seed multiplication; grain for laboratory analysis; possible feedback of trial data; collaborative evaluation of private sector materials | no data | application of molecular marker technology to improve hybrid parental lines: constraint analysis and impact assessment; use of sorghum and millet for malting beer and other products; transfer of hybrid seed production technology in sorghum to private entrepreneurs; cytoplasmic and genomic diversification in sorghum and pearl millet | ||
| IFPRI | * | * | |||||
| IITA | * | * | project on bananas | ||||
| ILRI | * | * | plant germplasm and improvement of livestock | ||||
| IPGRI | * | * | indirect and ad hoc in nature; informal consultations; information dissemination | no data | forest management for gene conservation activities; under utilized species; landrace improvement and seed multiplication projects; seed regeneration and expert system development, conservation of cacao genetic resources | ||
| IRRI | * | * | Bt rice research, Xa21 chitinase yield enhancing genes | • Plantech
• Novartis |
strengthening genetic resources capabilities of NARS, e.g. training sponsorship, facilitate purchase and upgrading of facilities | ||
| ISNAR | * | study on IPR and implications for NARS | |||||
| WARDA | * | * | |||||
Policy making versus the rhetorical quagmire
Much has still to be worked out between the CGIAR and the private sector.
If they are to collaborate further, they have to identify each other’s
common interest and understand their differences. Moreover, many other
members of the private sector have still to get acquainted with the CGIAR.
Policy dialogues must continue, but this should not be confined within
the CGIAR and the private sector only. Other stakeholders such as the National
Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs), universities, and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) farmers’ organizations and farming communities
from whom germplasm has been collected can significantly contribute towards
policy regarding CGIAR-private sector collaboration. For instance, the
success and failure of such collaboration should be guided and assessed
according to its benefit to small-scale farmers .
Despite the gradually increasing dialogue amongst these actors, suspicions
remain. Particularly, the NGOs remain very suspicious, and with many good
reasons. The Green Revolution has resulted in tremendous increases in yield
especially in Asia and Latin America. However, the Green Revolution has
also benefited large agro-chemical companies at the expense of the environment
and the many farmers who have been further marginalized as a result of
increased production cost and decreased prices of their produce. However,
polarization of issues, particularly in agricultural research, has never
been useful, and certainly not for farmers.
NGOs and the other actors cannot afford to isolate themselves in policy
discussions about research collaboration between the public and private
sectors. Critics have very legitimate concerns that small-scale farmers
in developing countries should not be exploited for the purely commercial
gains of private industries. However, it seems counter-productive to criticize
public-private sector collaboration simply because of the profit objectives
of the private sector. Obviously, profit is the raison d’être
of the private sector. They have their vested interest, despite all the
philanthropic rhetoric. It would be more productive to influence the public
accountability of private industries. Private companies want not only to
give their shareholders a return on their investments, but also to maintain
a credible public image. Civil societies should continue to exert considerable
pressure on the public accountability of private companies.
It is also counter-productive to criticize the CGIAR for failing to
eradicate poverty, despite the CGIAR’s ill-advised rhetoric of poverty
eradication. The root cause of poverty is the grossly unequal access to
productive resources. How can agricultural research ever change this unequal
distribution? It simply cannot. Nevertheless, agricultural research plays
a very important role in the sustainable improvement of agricultural production
for small-scale farmers in developing countries. This alone is a very legitimate
goal. Agricultural research needs to be integrated into the wider context
of poverty alleviation. For this, the expertise of actors in the broader
field of development work is needed, including actors involved in institutional
reforms such as land distribution, price and tax reforms and human rights.
Given the direction of agricultural research, and the growing dominance
of the private sector, would it not be productive to try, within realistic
boundaries, to influence the private sector research agenda for the benefit
of the public good? It will help to pursue a vigorous dialogue amongst
all the actors concerned. Towards this end, the CGIAR should make public
its assessment of actual research collaboration with the private sector,
including lessons learned in segmenting markets, IPR regulations, and the
implementation of biosafety and management of pest resistance in transgenic
crops. In research areas that are identified as being of critical importance
to small-scale farmers, but are not covered by such collaboration, the
budgets of the public sector should be increased. After all, collaboration
could be ideal but dependence of the CGIAR to the private sector would
be detrimental for the public good.
Gigi Manicad
Editor, Biotechnology and Development Monitor
Sources
Leisinger, K.M. (1988), "Sustainable Development at the End of the
Century: Perceptions and outlook". International Journal for Sustainable
Development, Vol.1, No.1.
Novartis (1998), Report of the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development. Basel, Switzerland: Novartis Foundation.
PSC (1995 -1998), Several unpublished reports. Washington DC, USA: CGIAR.
Strong, M., et al. (1998), The International Research Partnership for Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture. Third systems review of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Washington DC, USA: CGIAR.
Wagner, C.K. (1995), "The International Agricultural Research Centre: Poised for change". Technology in Society, Vol. 17, No. 4 pp. 437-451.
Personal communications with: M. Ghislain, H. Zandstra (CIP), M. Lantin, S. Özgediz (CGIAR), M.S. Swaminathan (Genetic Resources Policy Committee, CGIAR), R. Cantrell, W. Padolina (IRRI), C. Falconi (ISNAR), K. Leisinger (Novartis Foundation), and S. Dryden (PSC).
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