| Keywords: | Mexico; Private industry; Public institute; Plant production; Genetic improvement (plants); Disease/pest resistance; Potato/Sweet potato; Small-scale farming; Monsanto. |
| Correct citation: | Massieu, Y., González, R.L., Chauvet, M., Castañeda, Y. and Barajas, R.E. (2000), "Transgenic Potatoes for Small-scale Farmers: A case study in Mexico." Biotechnology and Development Monitor, No. 41, p. 6-10. |
In Mexico, a collaboration programme of public and private research is developing virus resistant transgenic potatoes, aiming explicitly at small-scale farmers. This claim is backed by economic models, but interviews with the farmers concerned show that they are not likely to benefit from the new varieties.
Potatoes are considered one of the most important food crops worldwide, and in Mexico they represent the third most significant vegetable in terms of acreage and production volume, after tomato and pepper (see box). Second to late blight (Phytophtora infestans), virus diseases, especially potato leaf roll virus (PLRV) are widespread; potato virus Y (PVY) is frequent at higher altitudes.
In 1991, the Mexican public research centre Centro de Investigación y Estudios Avanzados - Unidad Irapuato (CINVESTAV) began a collaboration with the agro-biotechnology company Monsanto (USA) to develop virus resistant potatoes (see box and see also the article by Commandeur in Monitor No. 28). The project has generated transgenic potatoes resistant to PVY and potato virus X (PVX) by transferring viral coat protein genes, and potatoes resistant to PLRV by transferring a viral replicase gene to the plants. CINVESTAV scientists declared that the PVX and PVY resistant varieties would be available by 2002, but this deadline might not be met because the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales Agricolas y Pecuarias (INIFAP), the national institute that is responsible for the field trails, has insufficient funding to undertake the trials regularly. The research concerns ten potato varieties: the white variety Alpha and nine coloured varieties: Rosita, Mozamba, Tollocan, Puebla, Michoacán, Mexiquense, Ireri, Norteña and Monserrat. Field trials are concentrating on Alpha, Rosita and Norteña.
If these varieties are released, they will be the first commercial transgenic varieties in Mexico generated in cooperation with local researchers. This project is unique because, from the beginning, small-scale farmers have been named as a target group. However, they were not consulted during the planning phase, nor have they been since. To evaluate the possible benefits of biotechnology for small-scale farmers, the Grupo de investigación Sociedad y Biotecnología (Biotechnology and Society Research Group) undertook a field study, interviewing these farmers in the mountainous areas of Mexico.
| Potato production in Mexico
Potato production in Mexico can be distinguished in two blocks, which differ along geographical, socioeconomic and varietal lines.
Only a quarter of seed potatoes used in Mexico are certified; non-certified seed and native varieties are grown in most areas. Certified seeds come from 10 tissue culture laboratories and 17 propagation greenhouses where mostly white potato varieties are produced. The total potato acreage rose in the past to over 73,500 hectares in 1989, but since then it has decreased to 63,000 hectares in 1999. The loss of acreage has been compensated by an average yield increase from 14.5 tonnes per hectare in 1989 to 23 tonnes per hectare in 1999. The annual Mexican potato production is about 1.4 million tonnes, with a value of US$ 300 million. Some 17 per cent of the potato harvest is used as seed potatoes, 10 per cent is processed by the food industry and 73 per cent is used for direct consumption. Because of high production costs and high price variability as well as strong competition between regions and between large-scale and small-scale farmers, potato production is highly speculative. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) grants Mexican potato producers a protection period from foreign potato imports. However, when protection ends in 2004, as many as half of the Mexican producers may no longer be viable due to cheap imports. |
The CINVESTAV/Monsanto programme on transgenic potatoes
Since 1991, Monsanto (USA) has trained scientists of the public research institute Centro de Investigación y Estudious Avanzados - Unidad Irapuato (CINVESTAV, Mexico) in its Life Sciences Center, both in genetic engineering techniques and field trials. This cooperation has been presented as a new model of technology transfer between private and public sector. |
The objective of the study was to inquire into several aspects of potato agriculture:
The villages in the study have had serious economic problems since 1989, because of falling potato prices and because of the strong competition of white varieties with higher yields, mainly Alpha, on the market. In the years before this crisis, a good cost-benefit ratio stimulated the input of agrochemicals. There was public sector support for an agricultural production system based on fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides and herbicides, and information on management problems was available. Recently, however, public technical assistance was abolished, and now the only technical assistance given is by the agro-chemical companies. If in the current situation agro-chemical inputs are reduced by the farmers, this is usually a financial rather than an environmental decision.
The decision to use farm-saved seed potatoes or to buy new ones, also depends largely on the actual financial situation of the individual farmer. Potato yields in these villages vary between 3 and 20 tonnes per hectare. These variations are due to different production conditions, which depend on the presence of diseases and agriculture practices dealing with rain regime, plague control, fertilizing and plant density per hectare.
Most of the small-scale farmers interviewed showed a great interest in any technological option that would increase their yields. Most farmers said that if CINVESTAV transgenic varieties were available, they would use them. For these farmers access to dominant technologies, both in terms of seeds and agro-chemical inputs, depends on their economic situation.
Virus resistant transgenic potatoes could contribute to agricultural sustainability if they could reduce the need for pesticides, but in order to achieve this, it is also necessary to increase farmers’ technical skills and their purchasing power to buy the seeds. At the moment, Mexican small-scale farmers only get technical assistance from local agro-chemical distributors who have other commercial interests. To introduce transgenic crops, CINVESTAV will have to establish an efficient link to small-scale farms. Unfortunately this requires additional funding which might not be available.
But still, socioeconomic, non-technical problems cannot be solved by technology and therefore the use of CINVESTAV’s transgenic potato varieties might prove to be unsuitable.
| Assumptions presented by Matin Qaim’s economic model on transgenic virus resistant potatoes in Mexico
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He comes to the following conclusion about the possible benefits for small-scale farmers: "if appropriate social support mechanisms can be implemented, the project could successfully demonstrate that modern proprietary biotechnology applications can help low- and middle-income countries meet their urgent development objectives."
At the moment, the research of the Biotechnology and Society Research Group shows less optimistic results about spreading the new technology to small farmers. One of the main weaknesses of small-scale farmers’ access to new transgenic varieties is precisely the lack of a public research service that could help them to propagate these seeds.
Qaim’s analysis is an economic one and therefore an important approach to study technological changes, but these kinds of processes are very heterogeneous and include economical, technical, political, social and cultural aspects.
Qaim’s technological framework uses assumptions based on political decisions with different assumptions leading to different scenarios. He states that the development of a technology is not a process that only goes in one direction, but that it has different stages and cross-connections, and based on this dynamic he assumes that an already existing institutional public programme can be the right mechanism to support the new technology of transgenic virus resistant potatoes. Currently, the influence of this programme to make seeds available to different kind of farmers is very limited, and its funding is scarce.
Qaim’s analysis considers different producers’ groups because technology adoption rates as well as farmers’ potential to increase productivity, can be very different in the various groups of large, middle and small-scale farmers. As Qaim recognized himself, the necessary data for this analysis is difficult to obtain in Mexico, but already these data include assumptions that limit the potential adaptation of a technology such as the virus resistant transgenic potato. This limit is not necessarily the only one possible, nor is it the desirable one.
In Qaim’s study the assumed model was that on a given acreage the conventional varieties would be completely substituted by transgenic potatoes, namely with one transgenic variety, Rosita. We consider this assumption neither desirable nor probable. In Qaim’s study it is assumed for technology adoption that Rosita would be the only red variety in Mexico because it is the most important one and more detailed data on varietal production shares are not available. He arrives at this simplification of reality from an economic point of view; however, the probability of such substitution should also be based on differences in the technology adoption capabilities between the different types of farmers. Also, it is not desirable to replace the agricultural diversity of currently more than ten different coloured varieties with only one transgenic variety. The restriction to Rosita in Qaim’s study might be a technical one, which the author himself also finds undesirable; but the desirable limit of technology adaptation should also include alternative biotechnological or conventional strategies that allow farmers to grow other products than potatoes.
A basic parameter for Qaim’s analysis was yield losses caused by different viruses. These data were obtained from expert estimations, but unfortunately there is no research available about the real incidence and effect of these viruses in the different potato regions in Mexico. There is also no experimental data that could show the impact of virus resistant potatoes on solving problems for small-scale farmers.
Since Qaim is assessing increase in yields, he does not consider possible environmental effects. In fact, he states that one cannot expect a different pest management regime as a result of using the new technology. Unfortunately, this contradicts one of the most important expectations of biotechnology in general and of the CINVESTAV project in particular: a reduced pesticide input against the insect vectors of the viruses where such pesticides are available and used now.
In the regions we studied, it stands out that several villages have become important as seed producers in an informal market where a lot of small-scale farmers buy their seed potatoes; there is even a certain supply from small-scale seed potato producers to middle-scale farmers. In contrast to this, Qaim bases his further conclusions on the estimation that most small-scale producers use farm-saved seeds. This biases his suggestion of a public institutional mechanism to distribute the new transgenic varieties. Under the present conditions we do not expect this distribution system to work out, because one of the main problems for small farmers is precisely the lack of a public research service that could help them to take decisions not only based on their current economic resources. It is claimed that governmental institutions should be responsible for bringing the new varieties to small-scale farmers, but these institutions are in a very shaky condition. In fact, some of the field trials that should have been undertaken by the INIFAP in North Mexico were not carried out because of the lack of funding.
Technological change is not unknown in those villages where local potato varieties are grown, but at this stage the question as to whether small-scale farmers will have access to transgenic virus resistant potatoes and whether they will benefit from it remains unanswered. If small-scale farmers in developing countries are to benefit from biotechnology, then it is important that the governmental policies not only attend their technological needs but also give them support in issues like storage and commercialization.
Yolanda Massieu, Rosa L. González, Michelle Chauvet, Yolanda Castañeda and Rosa E. Barajas
Biotechnology and Society Research Group, Sociology Department, Metropolitan Autonomous University-Azcapotzalco, Mexico City, Mexico.
E-mail ymt@hp9000a1.uam.mx
Sources
Qaim, M. (1998), "Transgenic virus resistant potatoes in Mexico." ISAAA Briefs, No. 7. ISAAA, Cornell, USA and ZEF, Germany.
Biotechnology and Society Group (1998), Impactos socioeconómicos de la aplicación de la biotecnología en la producción de papa en México. Metropolitan Autonomous University Azcapotzalco, Mexico City.
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