In North America concerns about genetically modified crops are concentrated within a minority of the population and are long-standing and consistent. They are rooted in philosophical objections to the manipulation of nature, and in opposition to private control and exploitation of the natural world. In pressing their case, however, the opponents of genetic engineering have adopted other arguments, less philosophical or overtly political in nature. They have had only moderate success.

Debates about genetically modified (GM) food in North America, both in the USA and Canada, take place against the background of a culture that generally welcomes new technology of all sorts. Enthusiasm regarding technology is not confined to scientists, engineers, and those associated with high-tech industries. New technologies are also celebrated in news coverage and in the pages of popular magazines. Indeed, "technological enthusiasm" and the idea that humans can invent a solution to almost any problem have been counted among the defining characteristics of North American society.

Yet a dissenting current of scepticism about technological progress also thrives. Among certain segments of society, this scepticism is one element in a broader critique of US-style capitalism and corporate power. Such attitudes are particularly widespread within the environmental movement, which emerged during the 1970s in opposition to the chemical and nuclear industries. Environmentalists in North America have achieved substantial political victories, particularly in establishing regulations on pesticides and other toxic substances.

The early debates over agricultural biotechnology reflected these social forces. In the early 1980s, as scientists applied the tools of gene splicing to plants, their accomplishments met with widespread acclaim. Headlines in major publications referred to "The Second Green Revolution" and "The Coming Cornucopia". Biotech entrepreneurs encouraged such sentiments, sometimes making unrealistic claims for their technology, which journalists were only too happy to repeat. Some scientists implied that they could shape the genetic identity of plants like putty. "In three years, we'll be able to do anything that our imaginations will get us to", the founder of Ciba-Geigy's biotechnology effort told Business Week in 1984.

Opposition to agricultural biotechnology formed slowly, based on several different concerns. Some predicted that manipulation of bacteria and plants would inevitably lead to the genetic manipulation of all life, including humans, and obliterate a proper and ethical boundary between human beings and the natural world they inhabit. Others were more disturbed by the fact, already evident in the early 1980s, that biotechnology companies insisted on asserting their right to own and control the genes and altered organisms on which the industry was built. Two landmark events in 1980 served to mobilize this latter group of opponents: a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that GM bacteria could be patented, and a new law that expanded the right of seed companies to claim improved plant varieties as their exclusive property. In addition to this, academic ecologists demanded that the government regulate GMOs, to ensure that scientists did not unwittingly release newly created invasive species that could permanently alter existing ecosystems.

By 1989, however, this rather inchoate collection of criticisms had solidified into a front of clear opposition to agricultural biotechnology, which took the form of a Biotechnology Working Group. Members of this group included advocates of small-scale agriculture, the Pesticide Action Network, environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund, Consumers Union, academic ecologists and molecular biologists, and churches.

Two developments during the 1980s were crucial in bringing together these disparate forces of dissent. Firstly, several chemical companies, foremost among them Monsanto (USA) and Ciba-Geigy (Switzerland), became the most powerful proponents of GM crops. Among environmentalists, almost anything promoted by the chemical industry was worthy of suspicion, if not outright hostility. Their suspicions were confirmed when it became clear that most of the first commercial products of agricultural biotechnology were extensions of the chemical industry's traditional business. Some crops were induced to produce their own insecticides and others were made tolerant to herbicides, thus expanding the markets for those agricultural chemicals. In 1990, the Biotechnology Working Group condemned herbicide tolerant crops in a report called Biotechnology's Bitter Harvest.

A second, development was the USA government's resistance to environmental regulation during the Reagan administration, leading to a series of bitter and vicious battles with environmentalists. In a curious twist, the biotechnology industry was forced to mount a campaign for regulation, persuading sceptical public officials that regulation was necessary in order to ensure public acceptance of the industry's products. When the Reagan Administration eventually unveiled its plan for regulating biotechnology in 1985, environmentalists imme- diately condemned the plan as weak and full of holes. In their eyes, the government had lost its credibility as a guardian of the public, and no government seal of approval obtained under this system would carry much weight.

Opposition to agricultural biotechnology however, remained a cause shared by a relatively small group of concerned individuals and organizations. Media coverage was sporadic and focused either on the political debates regarding regulation or the business prospects of biotechnology companies. The public did not appear to perceive biotechnology as the same sort of environmental threat as, for instance, toxic waste dumps or nuclear power plants. Nor did they appear to share the fundamental attitudes of organized anti-biotech groups; based on a conviction that genetic engineering represented a perilous intrusion into the natural world, and a scepticism toward the motives and trustworthiness of the biotechnology industry.

Opponents of biotechnology were thus forced to adopt other, more technical arguments, taking advantage of existing laws that were intended to prevent harm to the environment or to human health. Thus, battles over biotechnology were fought over details, not fundamental convictions and motives. Opponents and proponents of genetic engineering spent long days discussing such questions as the rate at which genes might migrate through cross-pollination from GM crops to related wild plants, and whether the wild plants might then become more 'weedy'. Other groups questioned the government's ability to ensure that genetically engineered foods would be safe to eat. These were, in the opinion of this observer, proxy arguments, the visible expression of motives that lay much deeper.

A tale of two GMOs

The public reaction to two of the first GM crops provides an intriguing study in contrasts. The first such crop, Calgene's (USA) Flavr Savr tomato, provoked extensive media coverage, but relatively little protest, either from NGOs critical of biotechnology or from the general public, and the opposition that did exist rapidly died away after the product had been on the market for a few months. Another crop, Monsanto's Roundup Ready soya, was introduced with very little fanfare, and was almost ignored by the news media, the general public, and initially even by biotechnology's most committed opponents. Within a few years, however, hostility to Monsanto's GM crops had become intense among environmentalists and within the emerging anti-globalization movement. Soon the mainstream news media began to take notice. The contrast in the public reaction to these GMOs was due in large part to differences in the strategy and identity of Calgene and Monsanto.

Calgene, a small start-up company that needed constant infusions of cash from new investors, never shied from controversy. It craved attention. Every news story in which it was mentioned was considered free publicity, helping to identify it as a leader in its industry. Calgene's chief executive, Roger Salquist, believed that the more people talked about the Flavr Savr tomato before it was on the market, the less surprised and fearful they would be when it actually did show up in grocery stores. Salquist also was convinced that the products of biotechnology required government approval before the public would accept them. For all these reasons, Salquist waged a very public campaign on behalf of the Flavr Savr for years before the product was even available for sale, producing a mountain of newspaper clippings.

This brought few protests from consumers, however, and opposition from long-time critics of biotechnology was muted. For one thing, Calgene proudly labelled its best tomatoes as products of genetic engineering, so consumers felt that they could easily avoid them if they wanted. (This was not, in fact, always the case. Lower grade tomatoes containing the Flavr Savr gene were sold, unlabelled and at lower prices, as standard tomatoes.)

Perhaps more importantly, Calgene was not the sort of company that aroused much opposition in the first place. It was not a chemical company with a long history of conflict with environmentalists. It was small, fitting the image - always popular in the USA - of the plucky start-up competing with corporate giants. It did not appear threatening, and it seemed even less threatening as the years passed and its financial losses mounted. Calgene soon disappeared as an independent company.

The introduction of Roundup Ready soybeans a year later went almost unnoticed by North American consumers. The national media paid little attention, perhaps because soybeans are not consumed directly by consumers, and perhaps because their appetite for news coverage on GM food had been sated by the Flavr Savr. Debates over genetically engineered food had narrowed to questions of environmental harm and food safety, and on both counts there were few grounds for objecting to Roundup Ready soybeans.

However, aggressive business strategies employed by Monsanto, succeeded in rekindling a wider debate over the uses and misuses of biotechnology. The company effectively changed the rules of the seed business, demanding that farmers who bought Roundup Ready seed also commit to the restrictive terms of a contract which included agreement not to use any part of their harvest as seed in future years. Moreover, Monsanto's representatives encouraged farmers to inform on any neighbours suspected of violating the contract. Finally, Monsanto decided to bring some of the largest seed companies in North America under its direct control. During 1997 and 1998, Monsanto went on a buying spree, acquiring maize, soybean, and cotton seed companies, in the short span of two years becoming the second largest seed company in the world.

In so doing, Monsanto re-ignited the passions of many long-term opponents of biotechnology. NGOs such as The Foundation on Economic Trends (USA) or the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI, Canada) had long warned that patents on genes and the granting of property rights over plant varieties would lead to corporate domination over agriculture, and all of the Earth's genetic resources. Monsanto's sudden emergence as an agricultural power seemed a vivid confirmation of these warnings.

At exactly the same time, 'terminator technology' - a technique for rendering the seeds of a plant sterile, thus preventing the saving of seed - emerged as a powerful symbol of biotechnology's potential for perfidy and profiteering. Monsanto helped make terminator technology famous when it sought to buy Delta & Pine Land Co. (USA), the seed company that owned patent rights to the technique. In a remarkably short time, with the aid of internet, outrage over terminator technology spread internationally among networks of activists, and articles about Monsanto's new role in the seed industry began appearing in the mainstream press.

The difference in the public reaction to these two GMOs illustrates the fact that for a segment of the North American public, the most troubling aspect of GM crops is the fact that they have proceeded hand-in-hand with increased private ownership and control. Monsanto, in contrast with Calgene, attempted to establish stronger corporate control over traditional practices in agriculture, and that attempt set off a major backlash.

Enduring controversy?

Ultimately, European protests against GMOs became the most important reason why the North American news media, and millions of ordinary citizens started talking about GM food again. Since 1999, all aspects of GM crops have been debated extensively in the media, in a variety of public meetings, and within both federal and local governments. Food companies have come under pressure to eliminate GM ingredients from their products. Virtually every major newspaper and magazine has taken note of the controversy. Debates have covered the potential environmental risks of GM crops, the safety of consuming them, the patenting of genes and Monsanto's ban on the replanting of GM seeds. The biotech industry also presented its opponents with an enormous gift, allowing Aventis' Starlink maize, which had not been approved for use in food, to contaminate a large proportion of the maize harvest in the USA.

Within a segment of the public, opposition to GM food has become firmer. Food retailers catering for 'environmentally conscious' consumers now offer those customers GM-free products. Yet this segment of the public still represents a minority. To an astonishing degree, the North American public has failed even to notice the controversy. In a poll of consumers in the USA sponsored by The Pew Charitable Trusts in January 2001, only 9 per cent of the respondents said they heard "a great deal" about GM food, while 54 per cent said they had heard either "nothing" or "not much". Half of the respondents said they were opposed to introducing GM crops into the food supply, but only 20 per cent believed that they were eating such food already. When informed that they already were eating such foods, many consumers changed their minds, and decided that GM food must be safe. In total, 48 per cent of the respondents felt that GM foods were safe, but a clear majority wanted them to be labelled.

According to other polls, North American consumers are little concerned with the environmental risks of GM crops, or with corporate control of agriculture, or the idea of playing God with nature. Their concerns are focused on the safety of food, or reflect a more vaguely expressed fear of unknown, unintended consequences.

The organized opponents of genetic engineering, recognizing this reality, have tried to focus on issues where they see greater potential for popular support. They have demanded the labelling of genetically modified food, and have focused their public campaigns on potential risks to food safety. They have also mounted an effort to convince farmers that growing GM crops is too risky, in view of opposition in foreign markets.

So far, these efforts seem not to have met with great success. There has been no groundswell of opposition to GMOs among the majority of consumers, and demand for GM crops among North American farmers has remained steady. This presents a challenge to the food industry, which is forced to reconcile these sentiments with the strongly anti-GM views of certain foreign markets, as well as a minority of North American consumers. The future of GM crops may depend on the ability and the willingness of grain handlers and food manufacturers to satisfy these conflicting desires especially as the European Community sets up stricter rules for tracing and labelling food ingredients derived from GMOs.

National Public Radio, 635 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington D.C. 20001, USA.
Phone (+1) 202 966 8586; Fax (+1) 603 649 0797; E-mail dcharles@alum.mit.edu

Sources
Hughes, T. (1989), American genesis: A century of invention and technological enthusiasm, 1870-1970. New York, USA: Viking.

Doyle, J. (1985), Altered harvest. New York, USA: Viking.

Fowler, C. (1994), Unnatural selection. Yverdon, Switzerland, Gordon and Breach.

Tiedje, J. et al. (1989), "The planned introduction of genetically engineered organisms: Ecological considerations and recommendations" Ecology, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 298-315 .

Charles, D. (2001), Lords of the harvest. Cambridge, USA: Perseus Publishing.

The Campaign to Label Genetically Engineered Foods. http://www.thecampaign.org