This article focuses on the regulatory structures that have provided the context for the debate surrounding the introduction of gene technology into Indian agriculture and shows how protests against its introduction have influenced and been influenced by the evolution of international negotiations, national regulatory procedures and local interests.

In the 15 years since biotechnology became a priority area for Indian policy makers there have been a series of crucial events that have deeply influenced thinking on biotechnology and the role of genetic engineering (GE) in agricultural production. The most important of these have been the multilateral negotiations that accompanied the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the formalization of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), the threatened introduction of 'terminator seed' and the arrival of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton (see also the article in Monitor No. 43 by H.Meyer and No. 44/45 by D.Sharma and B. Dinham).

Criticisms and doubts

Biotechnology has been received with a considerable degree of scepticism in Indian agricultural circles. Some critics questioned whether it could make any significant contribution to increasing food security, while others warned that it might actually threaten food supplies by stimulating the production of cash crops. There was also the possibility that it might adversely affect agricultural exports by encouraging the developments of synthetic substitutes for commodities such as sugar, an important Indian export.

Biotechnology was also associated with the private sector becoming increasingly involved in the provision of seeds and other planting material. Government policy in India is committed to ensuring food security. Public sector research focuses on both food and commercial crops and takes a balanced view of agriculture as a whole. The private sector, however, is primarily concerned with commercial crops and has largely neglected the orphan crops that form the mainstay of the diets of small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers. The growing power of the private sector is seen by some to be undermining food security objectives.

Genetically modified crops

It was the issues associated with terminator technology that provided a focus for concern about India's agro-biotechnology policy. Those involved in the ensuing debate came from all sectors of Indian society and included policy makers, providers of technology from publicly funded and private sector organisations, civil society groups and farmers organisations.

In 1998, Delta and Pine Land Company (USA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) obtained a patent for a new genetic technology designed to produce sterile seeds. These seeds, soon dubbed 'terminator seeds', were intended to prevent farmers from reusing seeds obtained at harvest and were expected to increase the value of the proprietary seed owned by USA seed companies and open up new overseas markets.

India's connection with terminator technology came through the life science company Monsanto (USA) who after acquiring Delta and Pine Land declared its intention to market genetically modified (GM) seeds despite opposition from the Green lobby. The company's decision to acquire terminator technology provided the catalyst for the launch of a determined campaign against GM seeds by a coalition of civil society organizations and farmers' groups in India. Many of these groups were already lobbying against the decision to introduce Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) into agriculture. In the multilateral negotiations that accompanied TRIPs and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Indian Government had not only played an active role, it had also taken positions at critical moments in each set of negotiations. These positions were strongly influenced by the campaigns launched by those civil society organisations that sought to highlight the interests of Indian farmers and the need to protect the environment.

The key issue in meeting the commitments that the Indian Government had made under TRIPs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the type of IPRs that should be introduced. One of the options open to WTO members was the adoption of the framework provided by the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). The UPOV Convention, formalized in 1961, provided a system for granting Plant Breeders' Rights. In the past, the UPOV Convention had allowed exclusive rights to be granted to plant breeders for the varieties they had developed, and at the same time it also allowed traditional farmers to reuse seeds obtained from their annual harvest and to exchange these seeds with neighbours. The most recent amendment to UPOV, carried out in 1991 (UPOV'91), however, took away the freedom granted to farmers to exchange seeds with their farm neighbours or re-use seed for commercial purposes. UPOV'91, therefore, took away what farmers saw as one of their basic rights.

Small farmers in India had been vocal in their protest against UPOV'91 and the Indian government did not adopt the UPOV option. The discussion did, however, contribute to heightening farmer suspicion. It was against this background that the idea of terminator seed entered India. It was, therefore, no surprise that the farming community forthrightly rejected it. The government's firm position against the introduction of terminator seed was clearly influenced by civil society campaigns that were determined to prevent a strengthening of intellectual property laws that would make it easier for seed giants to dominate the local seed market.

Genetically modified seeds

The controversy over the threat from terminator seeds had considerable fallout, jeopardizing field trials of a GM variety of cotton that Monsanto had been conducting since mid-1998. This variety of cotton had been developed by implanting a gene extracted from the naturally occurring Bt soil bacterium into the high yielding varieties of cotton already being cultivated in India. Monsanto claimed that this new variety of cotton would improve local cotton varieties and provide them with the potential to kill insect pests. This would result in substantial yield increases and, equally importantly, would offer what was presented as a more environmentally safe way of cultivating a crop that currently accounted for 40 per cent of the total volume of pesticide used in Indian agriculture each year.

In 1998, the Indian government had given the go-ahead for limited field trials of Bt cotton. Its view was that Monsanto's cotton variety could provide the necessary resistance to the bollworm pest and help prevent annual losses estimated to be worth up to US$ 190 million dollars. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) justified support for the adoption of Bt cotton on the grounds that the conventional crop required heavy applications of chemical pesticide in order to flourish. ICAR argued that conversion to Bt cotton would not only reduce environmental pollution, it would also reduce the burden of debt farmers were often forced to incur in order to purchase the pesticide needed to treat their cotton crop.

However, one of the main points raised by those campaigning against the decision to introduce Bt cotton into India was that the process for approving field trials had not been carried out with the requisite level of transparency about the environmental risks of using GM seeds.

Regulations

The regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in India has been subjected to the rules framed by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) in 1989. These rules, which were part of the Environmental (Protection) Act of 1986, defined implementing structures for conducting research and for the commercial applications of GMOs. This regulatory structure consists of six committees: three are under the Department of Biotechnology (DBT), one under the MOEF and two operate at subfederal levels closer to the actual site of GM crop field trials. However, although the Government had established this comprehensive structure for regulating GMOs as early as 1989, long before the global community reflected on the need to pursue biosafety regulations, critics in India have raised questions about the way the system operates.

One of the more pertinent questions relates to the fact that this structure of six committees is largely redundant since only two of the committees seem to have any role to play. These are the Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) of the DBT and the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) of the MOEF. The functions of these sub-federal committees remain largely undefined, and the way in which rules have been framed for the committees concerned with the regulatory administration of GMOs have given cause for concern.

The issue of Bt field trials brought these concerns to the fore. The regulatory procedure followed by the RCGM in the case of Bt cotton was questioned on several grounds by civil society organizations. First, field trials were approved by the RCGM after the farmers chosen for this purpose had sown the Monsanto seeds in their fields. Second, there was criticism of the role played by the sub-federal committees in granting approvals for field trials at 40 locations in nine states. Finally, the functioning of RCGM was called into question because changes in the rules of the committee were made when Bt trials were still in progress.

This lack of transparency in granting clearance to the field trials of Bt cotton was the single most important factor behind the farmers' protests in the Southern states. Proponents of genetic engineering argued that civil society campaigns had spread misinformation and re-emphasised that the objective of promoting biotechnology was essentially to increase the viability of Indian farmers. Misinformation or not, the campaigns managed to put sufficient pressure on the government to prevent an early introduction of Bt cotton on the market.

Government decision-making

The way in which Bt cotton was introduced into India illustrates the complex nature of the processes that are involved in governmental decision-making. In the past, vital decisions were often made and implemented before their implications were analysed. Today, we are witnessing a more active involvement of stakeholders before decisions are made on any particular issue. Many would insist that the lack of transparency still pervades but times are in fact changing.

In 2000, the three Southern Indian states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh (both scenes of farmer protest in 1998 and 1999) and Tamil Nadu gave explicit support for biotechnology and began to announce their biotechnology policies. This has provided the necessary mandate to the federal government to fulfil its unfinished task of completing the Bt cotton field trials. State level support for biotechnology has a deeper significance in the Indian context where the Constitution of India (which delegates powers between the central government and the states) defines agriculture as one of the issues that should be managed exclusively at state level.

It is becoming clear that the number of seed companies and State governments in favour of introducing GM seeds is increasing. The seed companies are anxious to introduce GM seeds as part of their corporate strategy, while state governments are more inclined to see these products in the context of their stated policy of modernizing agriculture. In July 2000, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee of MOEF approved large-scale field trials of Bt cotton by the Monsanto affiliate Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Ltd. (Mahyco) for seed production and demonstration and to generate environmental safety data for crops under various agricultural and climatic conditions (see also the article in Monitor No. 44/45). Mahyco was to undertake open field trials on 85 hectares and seed production on 150 hectares. Most significantly the ICAR, which includes agricultural universities as well as public-funded research institutions, would be fully involved in monitoring seed production. The decision to involve the ICAR system was taken even as the Central Institute for Cotton Research, one of the publicly-funded agricultural research institutes, was unveiling plans for putting its own variant of Bt cotton on the market by the year 2002.

The domestic biotechnology industry was beginning to assert itself in India, after spending years in the shadow of corporates like Monsanto. A start was made in April 2001 with agriculture high on the agenda and crops such as cotton, rape and mustard under research.

However, potential users of GM seeds within the farming community as a whole still do not appear to be convinced of their potential. In December 2000, the Minister of Agriculture informed the Indian parliament that a final decision on the use of GM seeds had yet to be taken. The campaigns run by civil society organisations have certainly contributed to this decision but much more coordinated effort will be required if these concerns are to be translated into policy.

Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS), Core 4-B, Fourth Floor, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, 110 003 India.
Phone (+91) 11 468217374; Fax (+91) 11 468217374; E-mail bisjit@bol.net.in

Sources
The Times of India, New Delhi. http://www.timesofindia.com

Deccan Herald, Bangalore. http: //www.deccanherald.com

Financial Express, New Delhi. http: //www.financialexpress.com

Hindu Business Line, New Delhi. http: //www.hinduonnet.com/bline

Genet News. http://www.gene.ch/genet.html